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United States Citrus Science Council v. United States Department of
Agriculture, 2017 WL 4844376 (E.D. Cal. 2017)
Stephanie A. George
As our world becomes increasingly more dependent on global
trade, issues have arisen with respect to the harm caused to domestic
producers. In U.S. Citrus Science Council v. USDA, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of California clarified domestic
lemon producers’ standing to challenge agency decisions that result in the
importation of foreign crops. This decision could create similar pathways
for future challenges to the importation of other commodities into the
United States.
I. INTRODUCTION
In May 2016, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(“APHIS”) promulgated a rule to lift a ban on the importation of lemons
from Argentina for the first time since 1947.1 The rule was challenged by
individual citrus growers, citrus packinghouses, and the U.S. Citrus
Council (“Council”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”).2 APHIS and the United
States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) (collectively, “Defendants”)
contested the Plaintiffs’ standing to challenge the regulation.3 The district
court found that the Plaintiffs established standing through competition
and the risk of environmental harm to domestic producers from pests.4
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
California and Arizona are the primary lemon growing regions in
the United States.5 Since 1947, regulations have barred the importation of
lemons and other citrus fruits from Argentina.6 The Plant Protection Act
(“PPA”) and its predecessor statutes authorized these regulations, which
allows the Secretary of the USDA “to issue regulations ‘to prevent the
introduction of plant pests into the United States or the dissemination of
plant pests within the United States.’”7 This authority has been delegated
to APHIS, which has issued a number of regulations on fruits and
vegetables being imported into the United States.8
1.

United States Citrus Science Council v. United States Department
of Agriculture, 2017 WL 4844376, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 2017).
2.
Id. Growers and packinghouses included Santa Paula Creek
Ranch; CPR Farms; Green Lear Farms, Inc.; Bravante Produce; and Richard
Bagdasarian, Inc.
3.
Id. at *1.
4.
Id. at *7, *8.
5.
Id. at *2.
6.
Id. at *1.
7.
Id. (citing 7 U.S.C. § 7711(a)).
8.
Id.
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In May 2016, APHIS proposed a new rule that would permit
lemons to be imported to the United States from northwest Argentina
(“Proposed Rule”).9 The Proposed Rule acknowledged that the Argentine
citrus crops were affected by pests, but suggested that the risk of pests
entering the United States via lemon importation could be effectively
mitigated using a preventative “systems approach”.10 An initial analysis
accompanied the Proposed Rule showing how the rule would negatively
impact small businesses, as required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act
(“RFA”). The analysis estimated that between 15,000 and 20,000 metric
tons of fresh lemons would be imported from Argentina annually, causing
a decline in the price of lemons of 2% to 4%.11 This equated to a $10.9
million and $22 million loss to California and Arizona each year
respectively, which the analysis concluded was not a significant effect.12
Following a notice and comment period, APHIS published its Final Rule
(“Rule”) governing the importation of lemons from Argentina, scheduled
to go into effect on May 26, 2017.13 On May 1, 2017, the USDA issued an
amendment to the Final Rule (“Amendment”), without providing public
comment, which stated “for 2017 and 2018, Argentine lemons would be
imported only into the northeastern United States.” 14
The Plaintiffs brought suit against the Defendants on May 17,
2017, challenging the Final Rule and the Amendment under the PPA,
APA, National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), and RFA.15 The
Plaintiffs amended their complaint to include six counts against the
Defendants, including: failure to disclose data and notes from a 2015
harvest site visit for public comment under the PPA and APA (“Count I”);
failure to make proper considerations in the pest mitigating “systems
approach” (“Count II”); failure to use notice and comment procedures to
amend the Final Rule and reasoning for the Amendment under the PPA
and APA (“Count III”); failure to provide reasoning for decisions made
under the APA (“Count IV”); failure to comply with NEPA (“Count V”);
and failure to comply with the RFA (“Count VI”).16 The Defendants
moved to dismiss the action on the ground that the Plaintiffs lacked
standing.17
III. ANALYSIS
The court analyzed whether the Plaintiffs met their burden of
proving standing to bring these claims.18 To satisfy the Constitution’s
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id. at *2.
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Id.
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Id. at *1, *2.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *3.
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standing requirement, the Plaintiffs were required to show (1) they had
suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that was (a) concrete and particularized and (b)
actual or imminent; (2) the injury was fairly traceable to the challenged
action of the Defendants; and (3) it was likely, not merely speculative, that
their injury would be redressed by a favorable decision.19
A. The Plaintiffs Had Competitive Standing to Challenge the Final
Rule.
In order to invoke competitive standing, the court found that a
party must “first allege that the challenged regulatory action has caused
him injury in fact, economic or otherwise.”20 A plaintiff must show a
direct injury and that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
court decision.21 The Plaintiffs argued APHIS’s own finding that
domestic lemon growers would lose between $10.9 and $22 million as a
result of a decline in price caused by Argentine lemon importation
established an economic injury sufficient for standing.22 The Plaintiffs
relied on case law stating, “‘economic actors suffer an injury in fact when
agencies lift regulatory restrictions on their competitors or otherwise
allow increased competition against them’” and that a reversal of the
regulation would remedy the economic injury.23
The Defendants argued that the importation of Argentine lemons
would not cause the Plaintiffs concrete economic injury for four reasons:
First, because they would be imported primarily during off-season
months for U.S. lemon production; second, the Argentine lemons would
be primarily sold in the northeastern U.S; third, the Argentine lemons are
a different variety than U.S. lemons; and fourth, because of the
uncertainty of lemon prices.24
The court concluded the Plaintiffs could show concrete economic
injury. Some lemons would be imported during months of U.S. lemon
production, creating competition with U.S. lemons.25 Lemons could also
be stored and sold during the off-season for production, which would
increase the amount of time Plaintiffs would compete with imported
Argentine lemons.26 The court also found the Defendants’ argument that
the lemons would only be imported to the northeastern U.S. unavailing
because an overall influx in supply of lemons would drive prices down
across the nation.27 Additionally, just because the lemons would be
imported to the northeast does not mean they could not be sold across the
19.
Id.
20.
Id. (quoting Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150 (1970)).
21.
Id.
22.
Id. at *5.
23.
Id. (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 861 F.3d at 950).
24.
Id.
25.
Id. at *6.
26.
Id.
27.
Id.
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country, and the Plaintiffs sold lemons to the northeastern U.S., so
economic competition would exist.28 Moreover, the court found
immaterial the fact that Argentine lemons were a different variety than
U.S. lemons, as an overall increase in the supply of lemons would lead to
a drop in prices, as shown by APHIS’s own predictions.29 Finally,
although lemon prices fluctuated, the basic principles of supply and
demand indicated that an overall increase in supply would drive down
prices.30 The court concluded that the causal chain between the
importation of Argentine lemons and the harm to the Plaintiffs was
obvious; therefore, the Plaintiffs had competitive standing to pursue
Counts I, II, IV, and VI.31
B. The Plaintiffs Had Environmental Standing to Challenge the
Final Rule.
The Plaintiffs maintained they had environmental standing to
bring their claims based on the risk that the imported Argentine lemons
could contain certain diseases that would spread to domestic lemons.32 The
Defendants contended that the spread of disease was highly speculative.33
The court acknowledged Ninth Circuit precedent that “an
increased risk of future environmental injury constitutes an injury-in-fact
for purposes of standing” and that “‘there is no requirement that the risk
of future injury satisfy any particular threshold of significance.’”34
Therefore, if the harm a plaintiff faces is credible, real and immediate, he
has met the injury-in-fact requirement for standing.35
The court found that the environmental harm to the Plaintiffs was
credible, real and immediate, and combined with APHIS’s own findings,
adequately established a significant risk of harm from pests due to
Argentine lemon importation.36 Accordingly, the Plaintiffs were not
required to “map out exactly how the disease would spread in excruciating
detail” to show a significant risk.37 Second, according to APHIS’s
Proposed Rule, APHIS identified nine pests of quarantine significance,
several of which posed “[medium or] high risk” for their potential
28.
Id.
29.
Id.
30.
Id.
31.
Id. at *7
32.
Id. (citing Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th
Cir. 2010)).
33.
Id.
34.
Id. (citing Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
402 F.3d 846, 860 (9th Cir. 2005); Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Lumber Co.,
230 F.3d 1141, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 2000); Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United State,
306 F.3d 938, 947-48 (9th Cir. 2002)) (quoting San Luis & Delta–Mendota Water
Auth. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 905 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1170–71 (E.D. Cal.
2012)).
35.
Id.
36.
Id. at *8.
37.
Id.
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likelihood of introduction into the continental U.S.38 Third, Plaintiffs
showed that pests carried on lemons imported only in the northeastern U.S.
could spread to California crops and cause damage by national
distribution.39 Therefore, Plaintiffs established environmental standing to
pursue Counts I, II, IV, V, and VI by showing the Final Rule would cause
a significant risk of environmental injury.40
C. The U.S. Citrus Science Council Had Organizational Standing to
Challenge the Final Rule.
Defendants argued that the Council lacked standing to bring any
claims because the organization itself did not suffer a concrete injury.41
The court found that the Council had associational standing to bring suit
on behalf of its members.42
An organization has associational standing to bring suit on
behalf of its members “when its members would otherwise have standing
to sue in their own right, the interests at stake are germane to the
organization’s purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the relief
requested requires the participation of individual members.”43 The court
found that the Ninth Circuit does not require each member of an
organization to be identified if the injury is readily apparent, and the
organization need only know that at least one of its members is injured.44
The Council is made up of citrus packinghouses, several of
which are made up of individual growers.45 The individual grower
members of the packinghouses had been determined to have standing in
their own right, so the packinghouses had standing to sue on behalf of
their growers and the Council had standing to sue on behalf of its
member packinghouses.46
D. Plaintiffs Did Not Have Standing to Challenge the Amendment to
the Final Rule as Alleged in Count III.
Plaintiffs’ Count III alleged that APHIS violated its duty to use
notice-and-comment procedures to amend its regulation restricting the
importation of Argentine lemons to the northeastern U.S.47 Defendants
38.
Id.
39.
Id.
40.
Id.
41.
Id. at *9 (citing Nat’l Council of La Raza v. Cegavske, 8 00 F.3d
1032, 1041 (9th Cir. 2015); Fleck & Assocs., Inc. v. Phoenix, City of, an Arizona
Mun. Corp., 471 F.3d 1100, 1105 (9th Cir. 2006)).
42.
Id.
43.
Id. (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental
Serv., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000)).
44.
Id. (citing Nat’l Council of La Raza v. Cegavske, 800 F.3d 1032,
1041 (9th Cir. 2015)).
45.
Id.
46.
Id.
47.
Id. at *10.
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argued that Count III should be dismissed because it could not be
redressed by a favorable decision.48
The court did not dismiss Count III on redressability grounds,
but on procedural grounds. As established by the Ninth Circuit, “one
who challenges the violation of a procedural right to protect his concrete
interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for
traceability and redressability.”49 To establish procedural standing, the
Plaintiffs had to demonstrate that the opportunity to exercise their
procedural rights through notice and comment on the Amendment would
have made a difference to their concrete interests.50 However, the
Plaintiffs did not allege they were injured by the Amendment, and their
concrete interests did not pertain to the Amendment.51 Therefore, the
Plaintiffs adequately alleged a procedural violation, but not a procedural
injury, so they lacked standing to pursue Count III.52
E. Plaintiffs Had Standing under the RFA to Challenge the Final
Rule.
The Defendants argued that the Plaintiffs’ did not have standing
to bring Count IV, which challenged the USDA’s compliance with the
RFA, because Plaintiffs failed to allege they were small entities eligible
for judicial review under the RFA.53 However, the Plaintiffs did allege
that at least one of their members qualified as a small entity under the
RFA. Thus, the court concluded this was sufficient to establish the
Plaintiffs’ standing to bring Count IV, even though not all of the
Plaintiffs were small entities.54
IV. CONCLUSION
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California
found that the USDA regulation allowing for the importation of lemons
from Argentina could be challenged by lemon growers, packinghouses,
and the Council due to overall increased competition and the risk of
environmental harm to domestic lemon production. This decision is
notable because it clarifies the pathway for domestic growers to protect
their production against foreign imports and provides them with a more
reliable domestic market. However, this trade restriction could negatively
impact consumers by eliminating competition. Restricting imports could
also negatively impact the export of U.S. crops to other countries,
causing a less reliable export market.
48.
Id.
49.
Id. (quoting Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Jewell, 749 F.3d 776, 78283 (9th Cir. 2014)).
50.
Id.
51.
Id. at *11.
52.
Id.
53.
Id.
54.
Id.

